A NEW TURN IN THE PRIVATIZATION POLICY G.Malginov, A.Radygin
The structurally approved priva za on program contains two sec ons, as before. The fi rst one contains main government's direc ves, forecasts of the eff ect which priva za on might have on structural changes in the economy, including plans of priva za on of the largest companies leading in respec ve industries and volumes of federal budget revenues generated from sale of federal property. The second one contains a list of property items to be priva zed under a normal procedure (514 SUEs (state unitary enterprises), 436 JSCs, 4 CJSCs and 94 other Russian Federa on Treasury's property items) similar to the procedure which have been employed over the past few years.
However, the new priva za on program diff ers largely from the previous program for 2011-2013 which was adopted in November 2010.
First, unlike all the priva za on programs which have been released since 2002 1 , the new program contains no explicitly formulated objec ves of the naonal priva za on policy. As a subs tute for such objec ves there is a reference to basically the Presiden al Decree dated May 7, 2012, No. 596 "On the Long-Term Na onal Economic Policy" rather than the objec ves and goals provided for by the "Federal Property Management" Na onal Program of the Russian Federa on approved by the Russian Government Execu ve Order dated February 16, 2013, No. 191 -r (without any specifi ca on). It is envisaged in the Decree that un l 2016 the state is to cease to held interest in companies involved in the non-mineral sector which are not regarded as en es of natural monopolies and defense industry, and also there is a reference in the context of the document to 1 It is to recall that the previous program for priva za on in 2011-2013 provided for the following objec ves. Create condions enabling one to encourage extra budgetary investments for the development of joint-stock companies based on new technologies; shrink the public sector of the economy with a view to enhancing and encouraging private investors' ini a ves; enhance corporate governance; provide incen ves for the development of the stock market; establish integrated en es in strategically important industries; generate federal budget revenues. Subparagraph "c", Paragraph 1 in which the government is commissioned to take measures aimed at increasing by 1.3 mes against 2011 (among other indicators) the share of products of high-tech and knowledge intensive industries in the gross domes c product by 2018.
Such reference has caused raised eyebrows, because the instruc ons on the enhancement of priva za on and management of state-owned property for the government are set forth in subparagraph "c", Clause 2 (not Clause 1) of the Presiden al Decree dated May 7, 2012, No. 596 . Unless it's just a simple inaccuracy, the new priva za on program fails to show any rela ons between sale of diff erent state-owned assets and growth in the output of high-tech and knowledge intensive products.
With regard to the content of the document, it should be noted that it contains addi onal exclusions: (1) joint-stock companies and enterprises which are included into the list of strategically important organiza ons, (2) minority state-held interest in JSCs which are subsidiaries of the parent companies of ver cally-integrated en es for the purpose of their further contribu on to the charter capital of parent companies of respec ve integrated en es, as well as (3) a federally-held 'single' interest in JSCs on which budget expenditures on the prepara on of priva za on exceed the amount of poten al federal budget revenues.
Second, in the forecast of the eff ect of property priva za on on structural changes in the economy quanta ve breakdown of economic agents which pertain to state property and are subject to priva za on was presented for the fi rst me in terms of type of economic ac vity rather than industries. In this context one may say that about belated harmoniza on of the contents of priva za on programs with the classifi ca on employed in sta s c reports as early as since 2005, which was repeatedly pointed out by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federa on. A nega ve aspect of such a change is that it is impossible to make a correct comparison of the structure of economic agents which are regarded as federal property. One only may assert that their quan ty has just been reduced over the three years between January 1, 2010 and January 1, 2013: FSUEs (federal state unitary enterprises) were almost halved (from 3517 to 1795), while federally-owned JSCs were reduced by more than 1/5 mes (from 2950 to 2337).
However, like in the previous priva za on program, the forecast of the eff ect of priva za on on structural changes in the economy has been performed as a mere formality, because it fails to even provide a general assessment of an cipated changes in the share held by the public sector, let alone the eff ect of priva za on on the dynamics of output, employment, investments and innova ons, budget load size rela ng to stateowned property, tax compliance status, etc.
Third, plans for priva za on of major companies have undergone serious changes against the way this process was specifi ed by the Russian Government Execu ve Order dated June 20, 2012, No. 1035-r in the current priva za on program for 2011-2013.
With regard to the list of assets suggested for priva za on, it has remained unchanged in general, with Rosagroleasing, Russian Agricultural Bank (it was previously stated that the state would cease to hold its interest in these en es un l 2016) and FGC UES (Fede ral Grid Company of Unifi ed Energy System) (a state-held interest in this en ty was envisaged to shrink down to 75% plus one share) having been removed from the list, whereas ROSNANO (a state-held interest was expected to shrink down to 90% through fresh issue and placement of shares), Rosspirtprom, Rostelecom and the State Transport Leasing Company having been added to the list.
However, unlike the priva za on program for 2011-2013 in its version dated June 2012, the interest held by the Russian Federa on in many largest companies is supposed to retain corporate control or at least makes it possible to infl uence the corporate governance procedure by holding a blocking interest (25% plus one share).
The la er op on is envisaged for ALROSA jointstock company (with coordina on of sale of the interest held by the Republic of Sakha Yaku a and municipali es), Aerofl ot Russian Airlines, Sovcomfl ot. What is meant hear is a state-held interest of 50% plus one share when it comes to Federal Hydrogenera on Company (RusHydro) and VTB Bank, whereas the state-held interest in JSC Zarubezhne also might shrink down to the same value, but un l 2020 (with an intermediate threshold of 90% un l 2016). The previous priva za on program envisaged that un l 2016 the state would cease to hold its interest in all of the above listed companies subject to the execuon of a special right for the Russian Federa on in the management of joint-stock companies (golden share) with regard to JSC Zarubezhne , RusHydro, Aerofl ot and ALROSA.
The other group included such companies as Russian Railways, Oil Transpor ng Joint Stock Company "Transne ", UralVagonZavod Scien fi c Industrial Corpora on in which the previous minimal possible stateheld interest (75% plus one share) has been retained. The State Transport Leasing Company has been added to these companies.
Shrinkage of the interest held by the Russian Federa on in the United Aircra Corpora on (UAC) and Unite d Shipbuilding Corpora on (USC) is to be extended to 2024, with the previous value of stateheld interest in the UAC (50% plus one share) being retained, whereas the state-held interest in the USC being increased (up to 75% plus one share against previous 50% plus one share). In this context the idea of retaining a state-held interest of 0% plus 9 shares in INTER RAO UES is not quite clear, because it was previously stated that the state would cease to hold its interest un l 2016 (the company is presently included into the list of strategic organiza ons).
A shrinkage down to 50% plus one share (previously it was stated that the state would cease to hold its interest before a specifi ed period) of the interest held by OJSC ROSNEFTEGAZ in Rosne oil company un l 2016 stands apart from the key dis nc ons from the previous priva za on program. Un l 2015 OJSC ROSNEFTEGA Z s ll may act as investor in fuel and energy companies planned for priva za on, provided that there is a program of fi nancing of such transac ons which provides for the use of dividends from companies' shares held by the foregoing joint-stock company.
With regard to a poten al shrinkage (down to less than 50% plus one share) of the state-held interest in OJSC Bank VTB, the program specifi es that it will be done with coordina on of measures aimed at shrinking the state-held interest in OJSC Sberbank of Russia 1 , though the Chairwoman of the Central Bank of Russia asked to exclude from the text of the forecast privaza on plan the items which concern poten al changes in the state-held interest in banks a er 2016, having said that the Central Bank has no plans to shrink the interest held by the Russian Federa on in Sberbank.
It has been stated that in the years of 2014 thru 2016 the state would cease to hold its interest in seven companies, namely Rosspirtprom, Unifi ed Grain Company (UGC), ROSNANO, Rostelecom, Sheremetyevo Internaonal Airport (SHIA), Vnukovo Airport, Vnukovo Inter- na onal Airport, of which only the UGC and the SHIA were facing such a perspec ve un l 2016 in the previous priva za on program. Furthermore, Presiden al and Russian Government's decisions on strategic development of the Moscow Air Transporta on Cluster must be taken into account with regard to the three metropolitan airports. These and some other companies (UGC, ALROSA, Rostelecom) may exercise the special right of the Russian Federa on to par cipate in the management of joint-stock companies (golden share).
It should be noted, however, that the cessa on of a state-held interest in actually each of these companies is very likely to raise certain ques ons.
Basically, it refers to OJSC Rostelecom whose reorganiza on was approved, by a Presiden al Decree in the spring of 2012, through acquisi on of OJSC Investsionnaya Kompaniya Svyazi (be er known as Svyazinvest) and its removal from the list of strategic en es, provided that the state jointly with Vnesheconombank take control over more than 50% Rostelecom common shares. However, by the beginning of the current year reorganiza on of the public segment of the telecommunica on industry was only at the stage of Svyazinvest addi onal issue under which the state will transfer core assets (including the interest in Central Telegraph, Bashinformsvyaz and other companies) to the holding company. To retain its interest in Svyazinvest (25% plus one share, the rest is held by the state), it is Rostelecom who must par cipate in fi nancing of addi onal issue.
In this respect, it should be noted that sale of the federally-held interest in Svyazinvest used to be repeatedly rescheduled for various reasons, of which a set of social and regional issues (tariff reform, social load on its subsidiary and affi liated regional communica on operators) prevailed along with reorganiza on and op miza on of holding's corporate structure as early as the 2000s, as well as restric ons rela ng to na onal security (provision of communica on services to power departments, protec on of interests of special consumers of communica on services). No praccal mechanisms of solu on of these problems with a new format of acquisi on of Svyazinvest by Rostelecom have been disclosed to date.
With regard to ROSNANO, the issue of compensa on for the previous budget expenditures spent on the asset contribu on from this former state-owned corporaon and the eff ec veness of development ins tu ons in general will logically come into focus; with regard to the UGC, the focus will be placed on the use of monies raised through a private subscrip on in 2012, as well as the storage of na onal grain reserves and par cipa on in commodity and purchasing interven ons; with regard to OJSC Rosspirtprom, the focus will be placed on ensuring control of the alcohol market amid a marked fall of legal sales of alcoholic beverages in response to raise in excises, and how budget generates revenues in general from this historically tradi onal source of revenues in Russia; with regard to the metropolitan airports, the focus will be placed on further budget fi nancing for the purpose of their reconstruc on and transparency of a new capital structure in view of the numerous problems which have been faced by the Domodedovo Airport since the mid-2000s 1 . With regard to budget revenues from priva za on, one may see a substan al reduc on in volumes, net of the value of shares of largest companies leading in respec ve industries. In 2014-2016 such revenues are expected to amount to Rb 3bn annually against Rb 6bn in 2011, and Rb 5bn in 2012 and 2013 which were forecasted in the previous priva za on program.
There is no forecast of principal revenues from priva za on of the interest in largest companies which have very good investments prospects, in case the Russian Government takes certain decisions, whereas the previous priva za on program specifi ed an amount of Rb 1 trillion for a period of 2011-2013.
Furthermore, it has been men oned that the President and the Russian Government might take decisions on priva za on by shrinking the state-held interest in a company through addi onal issue and alloca on of raised monies to recapitalize joint-stock companies with due regard to the aspects of long-term development and their investment needs required for implemen ng corporate development strategies, as well as capital adequacy requirements (with regard to banks).
If based on the informa on obtained from offi cial sources following the results of the discussion of the Dra Forecast Plan for Priva za on in 2014-2016 at Russia's Government mee ng on June 27, 2013, one may talk about around Rb 630bn as direct budget revenues mainly from sale of shares of JSCs which are leading in specifi c industries over three years (Rb 180bn in 2014, Rb 140bn in 2015, and Rb 300bn in 2016), as well as, presumably, with due regard to Rb 9bn from other sales. Another Rb 380bn are supposed to be generated as dividends OJSC ROSNEFTEGAZ 2 following the results of sale of Rosne shares. A total of around Rb 1 trillion and 20bn 3 of federal budget revenues are expected to be generated.
1
A long-las ng lawsuit with the Federal Agency for State Proper ty Management which concerns the ownership of a few buildings and structures, ill-defi ned ownership structure leaked out in connec on with the provision of transport security. 2 The head of the Ministry of Finance of Russia said at the aforemen oned mee ng of the Russian Government that he was not sure if it would be possible to generate this amount from the company. 3 However, the addi on of revenues from the specifi ed channels makes up an amount which is Rb 10bn less. The diff erence Furthermore, the materials of the mee ng also refer to a sum of Rb 1,7 trillion as the amount generated from sale of JSCs' shares in 2013-2016. Therefore, it is not quite clear how this amount corresponds to the previous amount of revenues.
Assuming that the sum simply contains priva zaon revenues of the current year, they should amount to around Rb 680bn, thereby exceeding direct budget revenues from priva za on over the next three years. This is very doub ul, the more so, because Rb 1,7 trillion are linked to a 3-year me horizon in other context. It may, therefore, be suggested that the diff erence between the values is a part of the monies generated from sale of largest companies which are supposed to be spent to develop these companies and increase their capital, but the program lacks respec ve numerical benchmarks.
Possible alloca on of revenues from priva za on of ALROSA shares (subject to coordina on of sale of the interest held by the regions and municipali es) for the development of infrastructure in the Republic of Sakha Yaku a, without specifying scales and proporons which would rather promote smaller budget revenues, should be considered in the same context.
It is very diffi cult to speak about whether or not the declared goals can be achieved, bearing in mind the amount of federal budget revenues from priva za on, because it depends both on the list and value of assets proposed for sale and stock market condi ons which depend largely on the current macroeconomic situa on.
With regard to the place and role of revenues from priva za on within the frameworks of budget process in dra ing a new 3-year budget, the Ministry of Finance of Russia took account of a total of Rb 925,9bn (Rb 230,8bn in 2014 , Rb 445,1bn in 2015 , Rb 250bn in 2016 of revenues from sale of the federally-held interest in joint-stock companies over three years in basic parameters of the federal budget for 2014-2016. According to the Russian fi nance department, shortfall in revenues from priva za on may be replaced with oil and gas revenues with possible reduc on in contribu ons to the Reserve Fund in the current year. A similar procedure, with a diff erent wording though, was allowed through amendments to the two previous federal budgets for 2011 and the planning period of 2012 and 2013, and for 2012 and the planning period of 2013 and 2014, when oil and gas revenues generated beyond a specifi c value might be used for the replacement of state borrowings and/or revenues from sale of state-held interest and other types of stakeholding, or for other purposes established by the law.
exceeds the single value of revenues from priva za on (Rb 3bn annually within the period of 2014 thru 2016) which is offi cially declared in the new priva za on program.
In this respect, it is to be recalled that neither the main part nor the annexes rela ng to sources of financing of federal budget defi cit, where inter alia there is only a general item on other sources without any specifi cs, of the applicable Federal Law dated December 3, 2012, No. 216 According to the Report on the Implementa on of the Federal Budget as of June 1, 2013 (according to sources of internal fi nancing of defi cit), posted on Fede ral Treasury's offi cial website, revenues from sale of a federally-held interest and other types of stakeholding amounted to Rb 17227,3m (no target value for the year was specifi ed).
The recently established budget process mechanism, when the text of a newly adopted budget law contains no indica ons on priva za on in the context of budget revenues, leaves a wide and unlimited scope for any decisions that can be made on the list of privatized assets, including terms and sale format of such assets. All the more so, as the exis ng priva za on program clearly shows that many amendments and updates with regard to a newly adopted similar document are very likely to be made.
A total of 45 respec ve legal acts and regula ons, of which 9 were released in 2013, 24 in 2012, 11 in 2011 (one was published as early as the very end of 2010), have been adopted under the Russian Government Execu ve Order dated November 27, 2010, No. 2102-r as of the mid-July 2013 since the adop on of the Priva za on of Federal Property and the Main Guidelines for the Priva za on of Federal Property in 2011-2013. In general, the new priva za on program looks more moderate and substan ated, given retained public corporate control of a series of companies regarded as natural monopoly and infrastructure en es involved in capital-intensive types of ac vity with long payback periods, playing a major role in realiza on of the structural and industrial policy, who acted as public agents in taking crisis response measures during the acute phase of the crisis of 2008-2009. 
